DPDP for fintech
A fintech sits between the customer and a regulated entity: a bank, NBFC, insurer or payment system. It collects KYC documents, bank statements and device data, passes them to partners through APIs, and scores them for credit and fraud. The financial regulators already decide much of what must be collected and kept. The DPDP Act decides how it is explained, consented to, protected and eventually erased.
Regulators decide what to keep; the Act decides how to handle it
The DPDP Act sits alongside the KYC, record-keeping and data-localisation rules of the Reserve Bank, SEBI and IRDAI. Data may be kept where another law requires it (s. 8(7)), and for transfers outside India a stricter law, such as the requirement to store payment system data only in India, continues to apply (s. 16(2)). Where the Act and another law genuinely conflict, the Act generally prevails (s. 38(2)). Under legal review: How s. 38(2) interacts with specific RBI, SEBI and IRDAI directions should be confirmed for each product.
Most fintech gaps appear where the two meet. A regulator may require a KYC record to be kept for a set period. The Act then expects that record to be protected for that period, used for that purpose only, and erased when the period ends. Keeping it in case it is useful later is not a purpose.
The roles also need writing down. In digital lending the app is often run by a lending service provider acting for a regulated entity that makes the loan. Who is the Data Fiduciary for each piece of data depends on that arrangement, and it decides who answers the customer’s requests and who reports a breach.
The Reserve Bank’s digital lending directions also limit which phone resources a lending app may read, such as contacts, files and call logs. Treat those limits and the Act’s data-minimisation duty as one requirement when you review app permissions. Under legal review: The current RBI digital lending directions and their exact limits on access to phone resources should be confirmed from rbi.org.in.
- The regulator decides
- Which KYC documents to collect, how long to keep them, where some data must be stored, what goes to credit bureaus.
- The Act decides
- What the customer is told, what consent covers, who may see the data, how a breach is reported, when the rest is erased.
- The facts decide
- Which of you, the app or the regulated entity, decides why and how each dataset is used. Write that split into the agreement, and make sure practice matches it.
The three roles, in a worked case
The Act gives three roles. The Data Principal is the person the data is about. The Data Fiduciary decides why and how it is used, and carries the duties. A Data Processor handles it on the fiduciary’s behalf, under a contract. The same business can be a fiduciary for some data and a processor for other data.
The case
Priya applies for a personal loan in an app run by a lending service provider. The loan is made by a partner NBFC. A video-KYC firm verifies her, the app fetches six months of bank statements through an account aggregator, and a collection agency is engaged after a missed instalment.
| Role under the Act | In this case |
|---|---|
| Data Principal | Priya. Her guarantor and the references she lists are Data Principals too, for their own details. |
| Data Fiduciary | Usually the NBFC, for her loan, KYC and repayment data, because it decides why that data is used. The app company is a fiduciary in its own right only for what it decides itself, such as its own marketing or product analytics. |
| Data Processor | The app company where it acts for the NBFC, and the video-KYC firm, the cloud host and the collection agency, each acting on instructions. |
Write the split into the agreement between the app and the NBFC. If the app later uses Priya’s bank statements to offer her a credit card from another partner, it has decided a new purpose and needs her consent for it.
What a fintech holds, and where it goes
| Kind of data | Examples |
|---|---|
| Identity and KYC | PAN, masked Aadhaar where the Aadhaar rules permit, address proof, photographs, video-KYC recordings, CKYC identifiers |
| Financial | Bank statements, account aggregator data, salary slips, GST returns for business loans, repayment history |
| Transactions | UPI and card transaction records, merchant settlements, wallet balances, failed payments |
| Credit and risk | Bureau reports and scores, internal risk scores, fraud flags, device fingerprints, location at onboarding |
| Collections | Call recordings, field-visit notes, alternative contact numbers |
| People who are not the customer | Co-applicants, guarantors, nominees, references and emergency contacts |
Where it comes in
- App sign-up and mobile-number verification
- Video-KYC and document upload
- Account aggregator and credit bureau pulls
- Phone permissions requested by the app
- Partner and agent onboarding (DSAs, merchants, branches)
- Support and collection calls
Where it goes
| From | To | What and why |
|---|---|---|
| Customer’s phone | Your app and servers | Identity, device and permission data at onboarding |
| Your servers | Account aggregator and credit bureau | A request under a consent that names the purpose, the data and the period |
| Your servers | Risk and fraud engines | Application, device and bureau data scored for a credit or fraud decision |
| Your servers | Partner bank, NBFC or insurer | Application and KYC file over a partner API, under the co-lending or distribution agreement |
| Your servers | Payment aggregator or bank | Mandates, repayments and payouts; card data stays tokenised |
| Regulated entity | Collection agency | Overdue account details, limited to the borrower |
| All of the above | Cloud hosting and backups | Encrypted, in the region your regulator requires |
Where fintechs are most exposed
| Severity | Risk | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| High | Over-broad app permissions | Reading contacts or photos the purpose does not need has no lawful basis, and contact lists have been used for coercive recovery. |
| Critical | KYC files on shared drives and in exports | Identity documents are what fraudsters look for in a leak. Access must be limited and logged. |
| High | Unclear fiduciary between app and lender | Nobody owns the customer’s requests or the breach report, and data drifts into uses neither party agreed. |
| High | Partner APIs that return more than needed | Over-wide API responses and shared keys let a partner pull data about customers it has no reason to see. |
| High | Consent reused for cross-selling | Consent to a loan does not cover marketing insurance, cards or other loans (s. 6). |
| Medium | Risk data used for other purposes | Device and behaviour signals gathered for fraud checks end up in marketing models. |
| Medium | Retention by default | Rejected applications and closed accounts kept indefinitely, beyond any rule that requires them. |
Who else handles the data
You answer for what your processors do with the data (s. 8(1)), and you need a valid contract with each (s. 8(2)). Some vendors are fiduciaries in their own right; the table says where that is common.
| Vendor | Data they handle | What the contract should cover |
|---|---|---|
| KYC and video-KYC providers | Identity documents, face images, recordings | Verification only; deletion after the retention period; breach notice within hours |
| Account aggregators and credit bureaus | Bank statements, bureau reports | Regulated in their own right: an account aggregator carries data it cannot read, and a bureau usually decides its own use of bureau records. Record the consent for each fetch |
| Payment aggregators and banks | Mandates, transactions, tokens | Card data held by them, not you; settlement data limited to reconciliation |
| Cloud hosting and managed databases | All customer data and backups | Region of storage; encryption and key control; access logs kept at least a year |
| Risk, fraud and analytics vendors | Device fingerprints, events, scores | Use only for the stated check; no reuse to build their own products |
| Collection agencies and call centres | Borrower contact and dues | Contact only the borrower; no phone contacts; recordings stored by you |
| SMS, WhatsApp and email providers | Phone numbers, messages | Transactional by default; marketing only to those who agreed |
43 controls written for fintechs, on top of 66 common ones
Alongside the common controls, the fintech assessment asks about the places where financial data is most exposed: KYC storage, app permissions, the split of roles with partner lenders and insurers, partner APIs, bureau and aggregator consents, card and account data, credit decisions, collections, regulator and CERT-In reporting, and where data is hosted.
| Module | What is checked |
|---|---|
| Organisation and role mapping |
|
| Data inventory and purpose |
|
| Notice and transparency |
|
| Consent and lawful basis |
|
| Data Principal rights |
|
| Data quality |
|
| Retention and deletion |
|
| Security safeguards |
|
| Breach response |
|
| Processors and vendors |
|
| Data sharing and disclosure |
|
| Transfer and storage location |
|
| Records and evidence |
|
| Access control |
|
| Incident testing |
|
| Policy and training |
|
Six of the questions you will be asked
Questions ask what you actually do, not whether you have a policy. Each answer maps to one control.
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FIN-08 High
For each product you run with a bank, NBFC or insurer, have you agreed in writing who is the Data Fiduciary for which customer data?
Why it is asked: Where a regulated entity owns the customer relationship, it is usually the Data Fiduciary and you act for it. Where you also use the data for your own purposes, you are a fiduciary for that. Each side owes different duties.
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FIN-03 High
Does your app ask only for the phone permissions (contacts, SMS, location, photos) that the stated purpose actually needs?
Why it is asked: Consent covers only the data necessary for the purpose. Permissions beyond that, such as reading the contact list, have no lawful basis and have been misused in recovery.
-
FIN-06 High
Before fetching data through an account aggregator or a credit bureau, do you record a consent that names that specific purpose?
Why it is asked: Consent must be specific to the purpose and you must be able to prove it.
-
FIN-21 Critical
Are the APIs that expose customer data, including the ones your own app calls, authenticated for every caller, limited to the fields each caller needs, rate-limited and logged?
Why it is asked: An API is a door to customer data. Weak or broad APIs are a common cause of large leaks.
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FIN-01 Critical
Are KYC documents (PAN, Aadhaar, address proofs, photographs, video-KYC recordings) stored with access limited to the staff who need them, and kept only as long as the KYC rules require?
Why it is asked: Identity documents are the most valuable data in a fintech breach. Security safeguards carry the highest penalty ceiling.
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FIN-36 High
Before data is used in a credit decision, do you check it is complete and accurate, and can a customer correct it and ask for the decision to be looked at again?
Why it is asked: Data used to make a decision about a person must be complete, accurate and consistent.
All 43 questions written for fintechs
- FIN-08 For each product you run with a bank, NBFC or insurer, have you agreed in writing who is the Data Fiduciary for which customer data?
- FIN-09 Do you identify the co-applicants, guarantors, nominees, references and emergency contacts whose details you collect, and give them a notice where you rely on their consent?
- FIN-03 Does your app ask only for the phone permissions (contacts, SMS, location, photos) that the stated purpose actually needs?
- FIN-44 When you analyse bank statements or SMS for underwriting or budgeting, do you extract only the fields you need and delete the raw files after analysis?
- FIN-10 Do you find and delete data from rejected applications, abandoned sign-ups and old lead lists that you no longer need?
- FIN-20 Is data collected for fraud and risk checks (device fingerprints, location, behaviour signals) used only for those checks, and not for marketing or profiling for sales?
- FIN-43 When agents, DSAs or partners onboard customers, does the customer receive your notice directly (SMS, app or paper), not only the agent's explanation?
- FIN-30 Are customers told at the start of support and collection calls that the call is recorded, and why?
- FIN-35 Is consent to offers of other products (insurance, cards, other loans) asked for separately from the consent needed to open and run the account?
- FIN-29 Before support staff disclose or change account details, do they verify the caller against details only the customer would know or a registered device?
- FIN-46 Can customers see and download their own profile, statements and consents in the app, without having to write in?
- FIN-11 Does each kind of customer record (KYC, transactions, call recordings, application data) have a retention period, with the regulatory reason where one applies, and is it deleted when the period ends?
- FIN-31 When a customer closes their account or withdraws consent, do you stop using their data, tell partner lenders and vendors, and keep only what a law requires?
- FIN-32 Are phones and laptops used by field agents, collection staff and support teams wiped before they are reissued, returned or disposed of?
- FIN-01 Are KYC documents (PAN, Aadhaar, address proofs, photographs, video-KYC recordings) stored with access limited to the staff who need them, and kept only as long as the KYC rules require?
- FIN-02 Do you avoid storing or displaying full Aadhaar numbers where the Aadhaar rules do not allow it, for example by masking all but the last four digits?
- FIN-12 Is account and transaction data encrypted at rest, and are account numbers masked in screens, reports, exports and logs?
- FIN-34 Do you avoid storing card numbers yourself, keeping only tokens or the last four digits?
- FIN-45 Are the cloud accounts that hold customer data protected: production access restricted, encryption keys managed, public storage blocked, and configuration reviewed?
- FIN-39 Are development and test environments kept free of real customer data, or use masked copies only?
- FIN-33 Does your breach plan also cover the reports your regulators and CERT-In expect, with one owner coordinating them and the DPDP reports?
- FIN-47 When accounts are taken over or fraud exposes customer data, do you assess whether it is a personal data breach that must be reported?
- FIN-22 Do written agreements with every vendor that handles customer data (KYC and video-KYC providers, cloud, SMS, collection agencies, call centres) cover purpose, security safeguards, breach notice to you, and return or deletion at the end?
- FIN-23 Before a vendor or partner gets customer data, and at least yearly after, do you check its security, where it stores data and who can access it?
- FIN-04 Is customer data shared with partner lenders, insurers or co-lending partners only under written terms, and are the kinds of partner named in your privacy notice?
- FIN-25 Do you keep a record of which partners, bureaus and authorities received each customer's data?
- FIN-26 Are requests for customer data from police, tax authorities or regulators checked by a named person, answered in writing and logged?
- FIN-24 Do you know where each system and vendor stores customer data, including SaaS tools, backups and analytics?
- FIN-07 Do you know which sector rules require payment or customer data to be stored in India, and does your hosting meet them?
- FIN-27 Can you show, for any customer, which notice version they saw and which consents they gave, through app and assisted channels?
- FIN-14 Is staff and support access to customer financial data limited by role, protected by two-step sign-in, and logged?
- FIN-13 Do customer logins use device binding or a second factor for sensitive actions, with alerts for new devices and unusual activity?
- FIN-18 When staff, agents or outsourced call-centre staff leave or change role, is their access removed or changed the same day?
- FIN-19 Do you review every quarter who can access the KYC store, production databases and admin consoles, and remove what is not needed?
- FIN-28 Is there a written policy on handling customer financial data, covering collections conduct, call recordings, screenshots and sharing on messaging apps?
- FIN-48 Are collection agents and support staff, including those of agencies, trained on what customer data they may use and disclose, and to whom?
- FIN-36 Before data is used in a credit decision, do you check it is complete and accurate, and can a customer correct it and ask for the decision to be looked at again?
- FIN-37 Is data you report to credit bureaus checked before reporting, and are disputes corrected and passed on promptly?
- FIN-41 Where you act for a regulated lender, is data collected through your app passed only to that lender and used and deleted as it instructs?
- FIN-05 Are collection agents limited to the data they need for a given account, and barred from contacting people other than the borrower?
- FIN-06 Before fetching data through an account aggregator or a credit bureau, do you record a consent that names that specific purpose?
- FIN-21 Are the APIs that expose customer data, including the ones your own app calls, authenticated for every caller, limited to the fields each caller needs, rate-limited and logged?
- FIN-42 Before a third-party app receives a customer's data through your API, has the customer agreed to that specific app and purpose, with a way to revoke it?
Evidence that may be asked for
A “yes” is self-declared until something shows it. These are the documents and records that usually do. Your own result lists what each control needs.
- Privacy notice in the app, shown before data is collected, naming purposes and partners
- The agreement with each regulated entity, showing who is the fiduciary for which data
- App permission list with the purpose of each permission, and the screens that request them
- Stored consent records for an account aggregator or bureau fetch, for a sample customer
- API documentation showing per-partner keys and the fields each partner receives
- Access list for KYC storage and an extract of its access log
- Retention schedule linked to the regulators’ record-keeping periods, with the last erasure run
- Breach plan covering the Data Protection Board, customers, CERT-In and your regulator, with one owner
What makes evidence good enough · How the Evidence Room keeps it
First actions, in the order they usually make sense
Remove phone permissions the stated purpose does not need
Restrict KYC storage to named roles and switch on access logging
Write down, with each partner lender and insurer, who is the fiduciary for which data
Issue per-partner API keys and trim responses to the fields each partner needs
Separate marketing and cross-sell consent from loan or account consent
Set a retention schedule per record type and an erasure routine
Rehearse a breach: Board and customers, CERT-In and your regulator, on one timeline
Your own result orders these by your answers and the law’s dates. How to plan remediation.
The reports a fintech usually needs
Fintechs are usually asked about data protection by the regulated entities they work with, before a partnership and at every review.
| Report | Who reads it | What it shows |
|---|---|---|
| DPDP Vendor Readiness Pack | The partner bank, NBFC or insurer’s due-diligence team | Your controls on KYC, APIs, hosting and breach response, in the order a partner questionnaire asks them, with the evidence state of each. |
| Remediation Report | Your compliance and engineering leads | Every open gap with an owner, a due date and the evidence that will close it. |
| Executive and Board Summary | Founders and the board | Where you stand on duties in force today and on 13 May 2027, without the detail. |
Start the fintech readiness check
The 43 questions above, plus the common ones, answered in your browser. You see your gaps, their severity and your first actions straight away. It is free and needs no account.
The law behind the fintech controls
Every section of the Act and rule of the Rules that the fintech controls rely on. Read them in plain language in the DPDP Act and the DPDP Rules guides, or in the official text linked from those pages.
Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023
| Section | About | Parts cited |
|---|---|---|
| s. 2 | Definitions | s. 2(i) s. 2(j) s. 2(k) |
| s. 4 | Grounds for processing | s. 4(1) |
| s. 5 | Notice | s. 5(1) |
| s. 6 | Consent | s. 6(1) s. 6(4) s. 6(6) s. 6(10) |
| s. 7 | Certain legitimate uses | s. 7(d) |
| s. 8 | General duties of the Data Fiduciary | s. 8(1) s. 8(2) s. 8(3)(a) s. 8(3)(b) s. 8(4) s. 8(5) s. 8(6) s. 8(7)(a) s. 8(7)(b) |
| s. 11 | Right to information | s. 11(1) s. 11(1)(b) |
| s. 12 | Right to correction and erasure | s. 12(1) |
| s. 16 | Transfer outside India | s. 16(1) s. 16(2) |
| s. 17 | Exemptions | s. 17(1)(c) |
Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025
| Rule | About | Parts cited |
|---|---|---|
| r. 3 | Notice | r. 3 |
| r. 6 | Reasonable security safeguards | r. 6(1)(a) r. 6(1)(b) r. 6(1)(c) r. 6(1)(f) r. 6(1)(g) |
| r. 7 | Breach intimation | r. 7(1) r. 7(2) |
| r. 14 | Rights of Data Principals | r. 14(1) |
| r. 15 | Transfer outside India | r. 15 |